MEV Wiki
  • Introduction
  • Resource List
  • Terms and Concepts
    • DeFi
    • Automated Market Maker
    • Arbitrage
    • Lending Platforms
    • Slippage
    • Liquidations
    • Priority Gas Auctions
    • Transaction Ordering
  • Attack Examples
    • Front-running
    • Sandwich attack
    • Back-running
    • Liquidations
    • Time bandit attack
    • Uncle bandit attack
  • Attempts to trick the bots
    • Salmonella
    • Kattana
    • Other attempts
  • Solutions
    • Front-running as a Service (FaaS) or MEV Auctions (MEVA)
      • Private Transactions
      • BackRunMe by bloXroute
      • Flashbots
      • mistX by alchemist
      • KeeperDAO
      • EDEN Network (ArcherSwap)
      • Optimism
      • MiningDAO
      • BackBone Cabal
    • MEV Minimization
      • Conveyor (Automata Network)
      • SecretSwap (Secret Network)
      • Fair sequencing service (Chainlink)
      • Arbitrum (Offchain Labs)
      • Vega protocol
      • CowSwap
      • Veedo (StarkWare)
      • LibSubmarine
      • Sikka
      • Shutter Network
    • Other solutions
      • B.Protocol
  • Miscellaneous
  • Contributions
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On this page
  • Introduction
  • What is MEV?
  • Why does this matter¹?
  • Just how bad is the problem?

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Introduction

Welcome to the MEV Wiki.

NextResource List

Last updated 3 years ago

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Introduction

This is a public resource for learning about MEV (Maximal Extractable Value).

We cover a range of topics including the key concepts, research on this the topic, different approaches to tackling this issue by various projects out there.

Find any errors or wants to share your opinions? See how you can contribute .

What is MEV?

Maximal (formerly "miner" in the context of Proof of Work) extractable value (MEV) refers to the maximum value that can be extracted from block production in excess of the standard block reward and gas fees by censoring and/or changing the order of transactions in a block.

When someone sends a transaction in the blockchain, there is a delay between the time when the transaction is broadcasted to the network and when it is actually mined into a block. During this period, transactions sit in a pending transaction pool called the mempool where contents are visible to everyone. Arbitrageurs and miners can monitor the mempool and find opportunities to maximize their own profits e.g. by frontrunning transactions. If a front-runner is a miner, they can also reorder or even censor transactions. MEV income can also be shared with non miners & traders who participate in some profit sharing schemes within the category of .

Why does this matter?

MEV can harm users

MEV is an invisible tax that miners can collect from users.

MEV can destabilize Ethereum

If block rewards are small enough compared to MEV, it can be rational for miners to destabilize consensus by reordering or censoring transactions.

Just how bad is the problem?

It is estimated that more than $727M of MEV has been extracted since 1st January 2020.

You can use the to track Extracted MEV to better assess this worsening trend realtime.

The majority of extracted MEV tend to be from opportunities on various , with a large percentage of income going to searchers, bots & participants in profit sharing MEV infrastructures (eg. MEV-GETH)

Another useful tracker for gas consumption of back-running bots: provides very detailed statistics on this worsening MEV situation.

Link: According to ↩¹

Flashbots Dashboard
Arbitrage
AMMs
Flashbot's
Dune Analytics
https://research.paradigm.xyz/MEV
here
FaaS/MEVA
¹
Snapshot of Extracted MEV on 28 Sep 2021 from Flashbots
Snapshot of Extracted MEV Split on 28 Sep 2021 from Flashbots